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While the tension between political equality and economic inequality is as old as democracy
itself, a recent wave of scholarship has highlighted its acute relevance for democracy in America
today. In contrast to the view that legislative responsiveness favoring the auent is near to
inevitable when income inequality is high, we argue that organized labor can be an eective
source of political equality in the US House of Representatives. Our novel dataset combines
income-specic estimates of constituency preferences based on 223,000 survey respondents
matched to 27 roll-call votes with a measure of district-level union strength drawn from
administrative records. We nd that local unions signicantly dampen unequal responsiveness
to high incomes: a standard deviation increase in union membership increases legislative
responsiveness towards the poor by about 6 to 8 percentage points. We rule out alternative
explanations using district xed eects, interactive and exible controls accounting for policies
and institutions, as well as a novel instrumental variable for unionization based on history and
geography. We also show that the impact of unions operates via campaign contributions and
partisan selection. Our ndings underline calls to bring back organized labor into the analysis
of political representation.
∗For valuable feedback on previous versions, we are grateful to participants at the annual meetings of APSA (2017),
MPSA (2018), University of Geneva workshops on Unions and the Politics of Inequality (2018) and Unequal
Democracies (2019), IPErG seminar at University of Barcelona, and IAST. Becher acknowledges IAST funding
from the French National Research Agency (ANR) under the Investments for the Future (Investissements
d’Avenir) program, grant ANR-17-EURE-0010. Stegmueller’s research was supported by the National Research
Foundation of Korea (NRF-2017S1A3A2066657).
†Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole, michael.becher@iast.fr
‡Duke University, daniel.stegmueller@duke.edu
I. Introduction
Democratic theory holds that people’s preferences should be equally represented in collec-
tive decision making regardless of their income and wealth. But it has long been recognized
that there is a potentially fateful tension between the ideal of political equality and factual
economic inequality. Considering the role of campaign contributions, for instance, it is easy to
grasp that advantages in economic resources can lead to advantages in political representation
even when elections are free and fair (Campante 2011). Over the last two decades, political
science research assessing the degree of unequal representation in the US has boomed. It
has highlighted worrying disparities in political responsiveness. However, there is much less
evidence on what policies or institutions can dampen political inequality.
Larry Bartels’ (2008) pioneering study revealed that US senators casting roll call votes
respond much more to the views of the auent than to middle income constituents. e
preferences of the poor seem to be virtually ignored. Evidence of unequal representation has
also been found for the House of Representatives, party platforms, and national and state policy
(e.g., see Bartels 2016; Bhai and Erikson 2011; Flavin 2012; Gilens 2012; Hertel-Fernandez
et al. 2019; Rhodes and Schaner 2017; Rigby and Wright 2013). Beyond the American context,
recent scholarship documents similar paerns across a range of political systems in advanced
industrialized democracies (Bartels 2017; Elsässer et al. 2018). us, it may appear that unequal
democracy is a constant feature of capitalism. In contrast, we argue that organized labor can
be an eective source of political equality in the US even in times of high economic inequality.
We contribute to this research agenda by analyzing the causal role labor unions play in
enhancing legislative responsiveness to the poor. A large literature in comparative politics,
economics, and sociology examines the eect of unions on economic inequality and redistribu-
tive politics (Ahlquist 2017). However, as noted by Kathleen elen, the study of labor unions
typically “does not come up in the mainstream literature on American Politics” (elen 2019:
12).1 Unions are one of the few membership organizations in national politics that advocate on
the behalf of non-managerial workers (Schlozman et al. 2012) and sometimes even strike in the
interest of others (Ahlquist and Levy 2013).
1ere is of course a large literature on the role of unions in political life in general. It has documented that union
membership is associated with lower income dierentials in political participation (Leighley and Nagler 2007)
or political knowledge (Macdonald 2019). Recently, the politics of teachers’ unions has received increasing
scholarly aention (Moe 2011). While providing important insight into the strategic actions of unions and
their impact on individual political behavior, this literature does not address their impact on citizens’ unequal
representation in the actual decision making of lawmakers.
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Yet few scholars have directly addressed the question whether stronger unions translate
into less income-biased responsiveness by elected representatives. Studying the 110th House of
Representatives, Ellis (2013) nds that district-level unionization is related to a smaller rich-poor
gap for key legislative votes. Flavin (2018) conducts a cross-sectional state-level analysis and
shows that American states with stronger unions exhibit less unequal representation. Gilens
and Page (2014) conclude that mass-based interest groups, including unions, have lile to no
independent inuence on national policy in the US.
However, the existing evidence is of correlational nature. Prior scholarship does not
disentangle whether union strength merely correlates with or actually causes higher political
equality. One major endogeneity threat stems from the potential of policy feedback. As John
Ahlquist points out in a recent review, unions may inuence “parties and policy, but policy and
institutions also aect unionization rates” (Ahlquist 2017: 427). Hence, weaker unions may be
more of a symptom rather than a cause of biased representation. While many workers express
support for unionized jobs (Freeman and Rogers 2006), state and local politicians set varying
rules that aect costs and benets of union membership. Recent research highlights the political
logic behind the expansion of public sector union laws in the 1960s and 1970s (Anzia and Moe
2016; Flavin and Hartney 2015) as well as the countervailing success of conservative groups to
demobilize public sector unions since the early 2000s (Hertel-Fernandez 2018). In the private
sector, ‘right-to-work’ laws hamper unionization eorts and can have profound political eects
(Feigenbaum et al. 2018). Furthermore, any relationship between union strength and equal
legislative responsiveness may be spuriously driven by the same underlying determinants.
Following seminal research on the importance of social capital for making democracy work
(Putnam 1993, 2000), workers in congressional districts with more social capital may be beer
represented in both their workplace and in Congress without a causal arrow running from the
former to the laer.
In addition to concerns about causality, the literature faces the challenge of how to measure
public preferences. When standard election surveys are sliced by income groups in subnational
units (e.g., states or congressional districts) sampling noise becomes relevant and may produce
“wobbly estimates” that hinder a decisive verdict (Bhai and Erikson 2011: 232). Random
measurement error generally leads to underestimation of the eect of public opinion on policy.
While this concern can be mitigated by using the large Cooperative Congressional Election
Study (CCES), it (and other large surveys) are not designed to be representative at the level of
2
congressional districts. One may thus worry that the seeming legislative underrepresentation
of the poor may in part be an artifact of systematic sampling error.2
In this paper we address these problems using ne-grained data on local unions and cor-
rected estimates of policy preferences. We account for local unobservables via district xed
eects and we conduct analyses where we introduce a new instrumental variable for union
density. We examine the impact of unions on the preference-roll-call link in the contempo-
rary US Congress, where unequal responsiveness by legislators and their sta has been well
documented (Bartels 2008, 2016; Ellis 2013; Hertel-Fernandez et al. 2019; Rhodes and Schaner
2017). We focus on members of the House of Representatives during the 109–112th Congress
(2005-2012) since this seing enables us to capture within-state variation in union strength and
within-district variation in preference polarization by income across a range of salient policy
issues.
At its core, our dataset combines income-specic measures of constituency preferences
based on 223,000 survey respondents matched to 27 roll-call votes with information on local
unions extracted from more than 350,000 administrative records. We measure district-level
preferences using multiple waves of the CCES and calculate preferences on 27 concrete policies
for each income group in each congressional district. We employ small area estimation using
micro-census data (this circumvents sampling issues with the CCES; but note that our ndings
are robust when using multilevel regression and poststratication [MRP] instead). Drawing
on recent work by Becher et al. (2018), we measure the district-level strength of unions using
mandatory reports led by local unions to the Department of Labor.3
Our empirical analysis traces the legislative responsiveness of House members to the
preferences of dierent income groups in their constituency conditional on district-level union
strength. In line with previous research, we nd that House members are signicantly less
responsive to the policy preferences of low-income than upper income constituents. However,
this gap in responsiveness is smaller where unions are stronger, and it decreases signicantly
where union members are comparatively numerous. Our estimates suggest that a standard
deviation increase in unionization increases responsiveness towards the poor by about 6 to 8
percentage points. e impact of unions is large enough to swing key votes.
2Other empirical issues have been raised with respect to research on policy adoption (Gilens 2012; Gilens and
Page 2014). For instance, see Bashir (2015); Enns (2015); Erikson (2015); Soroka and Wlezien (2008).
3e study of Becher et al. (2018) examines the eect of union density and union concentration on roll call
voting. It does not measure constituency preferences and thus cannot examine the extent of income-biased
responsiveness. Furthermore, it lacks the exogenous source of variation in union density that we introduce in
this paper.
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To rule out alternative explanations, we start by controlling for district xed eects. enwe
allow for additional interactions between income-group preferences and alternative moderators,
such as state-level policies, state xed eects, district socio-demographics and proxies for social
capital. For more robust causal identication, we leverage plausibly exogenous variation in
union strength that stems from geography and the history of union mobilization in the middle
of the twentieth century, rather than policy feedback, tastes, or institutions. At the time,
virtually all coal and metal mines were unionized throughout the country. e location of
these industries is mainly determined by nature, and initial unionization lead to subsequent
spillovers in union membership in other industries (Holmes 2006). is suggest we can use local
employment in mining in the 1950s as a valid instrumental variables for union membership
more than 5 decades later. To further probe robustness of the ndings with respect omied
variable bias and functional form assumptions, we employ a general post-double-selection
estimator, which combines machine learning variable selection with causal inference methods.
ese additional tests conrm the initial regression results. Hence, we conclude that unions
curb unequal representation in the legislative arena.
ese ndings have important implication for the debate about inequality and democracy.
Scholars oen nd it straightforward to explain why the poor are poorly represented. By
denition, those in lower part of the income distribution have less resources, and many studies
have shown that they are less likely to participate in politics. In contrast, our results show that
this outcome is not hardwired into the fabric of American democracy. In the congressional
arena, local unions are a countervailing force. Our results imply that political eorts to weaken
unions, as illustrated in recent reforms in Michigan or Wisconsin, are likely to exacerbate
unequal responsiveness in representation. ey magnitude of the union eect may also explain
why unions remain under aack by conservative groups (Hertel-Fernandez 2018).
Our focus is complementary to research on contributions, political participation, or parti-
sanship as important determinants of unequal legislative responsiveness (Barber 2016; Leighley
and Oser 2018; Rhodes and Schaner 2017). From our institutional perspective, these factors
are mechanisms through which unions aect representation, and we provide some evidence in
line with this.4
4Also complementary, a large literature examines how formal political institutions aect how the poor are
represented across countries (e.g., Iversen and Soskice 2006; Long Jusko 2017).
4
Theoretical Motivation
Various strands of scholarship in political science and related elds suggest that labor
unions are one of the few mass-membership organization that provide collective voice to
lower income individuals (Ahlquist 2017; Ellis 2013; Flavin 2018; Freeman and Medo 1984;
Schlozman et al. 2012).5 Consistent with a central premise of the collective voice perspective,
contemporary unions in the US tend to take positions favored by less auent citizens.6 However,
shared preferences between the less well-o and organized labor are by no means sucient to
alter inequalities in political representation. is requires an eective political transmission
mechanism. Several prominent scholars of representation are skeptical. ey suggest that
unions have become too weak, too narrow, or too fragmented to have a signicant egalitarian
political impact in national politics (e.g., Gilens 2012: 175; Hacker and Pierson 2010: 143).
As discussed above, the endogeneity of union organization to politics means that scholars
cannot take a correlation between union density and political equality as sucient evidence of
causality, but should investigate it using a more credible research design (Ahlquist 2017).
e ability of unions to increase the rate of political participation—including voting, contact-
ing ocials, aending rallies, or making donations—of low- and middle-income citizens is oen
considered to be their key channel of political inuence. Importantly, unions may also increase
participation among non-members with similar policy preferences through get-out-the-vote
campaigns and social networks (Leighley and Nagler 2007; Rosenfeld 2014; Schlozman et al.
2012).7 Making contributions to favored candidates and campaigns complements the ability of
unions to communicate with and mobilize members or to provide campaign volunteers. Indeed,
unions are among the leading contributors to political action commiees (PAC), accounting
for a quarter of total PAC spending in 2009 (Schlozman et al. 2012: ch. 14). In contrast to
5Labor unions are organizations formed to bargain collectively, on behalf of their members, with employers over
wages and conditions. Once formed, unions may (and oen do) enter the political arena (Freeman and Medo
1984; Olson 1965).
6Gilens (2012: 154-161) compares public positions of national unions with mass policy preferences across several
hundred policy issues and nds that unions’ positions are most strongly correlated with the preferences of the
less well-o. Similarly, Schlozman et al. (2012: 87) conclude that unions are one of the few organizations in
national politics “that advocate on behalf of the economic interest of workers who are not professionals or
managers.” See also Hacker and Pierson (2010); Schlozman (2015); Schlozman et al. (2018).
7Unions may also increase the salience of policy preferences, provide information to reduce uncertainty about
which candidate/party is closer to members’ preferred position, or shape the content of policy preferences
through leadership or social interactions (Ahlquist and Levy 2013; Iversen and Soskice 2015; Kim and Margalit
2017; Mosimann and Pontusson 2017). While most of the literature on unequal representation takes the
content of preferences as given (this study included), union eects on salience and, to some extent, political
information are consistent with a mobilization mechanism and evidence presented later on. We agree that a
full understanding of representation requires endogenizing citizens’ preferences.
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corporations and business organizations, union contributions “represent the aggregation of a
large number of small individual donations” (Schlozman et al. 2012: 428).8
e credible threat of political mobilization can aect policy decisions by representatives in
two general ways. First, it may shape who is elected in a given electoral district. If politicians are
not exchangeable (because they dier in their commitments and beliefs), political selection is
important. In an age of elite polarization, the partisan identity of a representative is oen crucial
for determining legislative voting (Bartels 2016; Rhodes and Schaner 2017; Lee et al. 2004).
Since the New Deal era, unions and union members have largely allied with the Democratic
Party, given its stronger support for many of their broader policy demands (Lichtenstein 2013;
Schlozman 2015).9
Second, unions’ mobilization potential shapes the incentives of elected representatives,
beyond their partisan aliation and personal traits. Policymakers’ rational anticipation of
public reactions plays a central role in theories of accountability and dynamic responsiveness
(Arnold 1990; Stimson et al. 1995). While many individual legislative votes do not aect
the reelection prospects of representatives, on potentially salient votes they can face hard
choices between party ideology and competing constituency preferences. On international
trade agreements, for instance, Democratic representatives have faced cross-pressures between
a more skeptical stance taken by unions and low-income constituents versus that of their own
party (Box-Steensmeier et al. 1997). On the other side of the aisle, Republican legislators, in
the wake of the nancial crisis, found themselves torn between their own partisan views on
stimulus spending and the pressure from less well-o constituents (Mian et al. 2010).
Politicians’ incentives are also linked to information. eories of representation emphasize
that members of Congress, and especially the House, face numerous voting decisions in each
term, and it would be unrealistic to assume that they have access to reliable, unbiased polling
data on constituency preferences on all the issues they face (Arnold 1990; Miller and Stokes
1963). Instead, representatives—with the help of their staers—rely on alternative methods
to assess public opinion, including constituent correspondence, town halls, contacts with
community leaders, or local organizations. In this limited information context, local unions can
enhance the visibility and perception of constituent preferences (Hertel-Fernandez et al. 2019).
Taken together, this reasoning implies that the district-level strength of labor unions
increases the responsiveness by members of Congress to the less auent. While we know
8While evidence on the direct eect of contributions on legislative behavior is mixed, recent eld-experimental
results demonstrate that contributions help to provide access (Kalla and Broockman 2016) or sway congressional
staers (Hertel-Fernandez et al. 2019).
9Political selection might also shape other political characteristics of representatives, such as their class back-
ground or race (Butler 2014; Carnes 2013).
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from previous work that politicians are considerably more responsive to the preferences of the
auent than those of the less well-o, this bias should be reduced in districts with relatively
higher union membership. Substantively, it is crucial to assess how far the presence of unions
can move responsiveness toward the ideal of political equality.
e strength of local unions underpins a credible mobilization threat that impacts the
action of candidates and legislators. Anticipating mobilizing eorts by unions, a potential
candidate may not even enter into the race; an elected, career-oriented, politician might be
pressured to alter his or her vote even without a full mobilization eort as long as unions’
mobilization capacity is visible. us, both campaign contributions and candidate selection
should maer as a channel linking local union strength and representation.
Data and Measurement
Any eort to test the relevance of unions for unequal representation confronts major
challenges of measurement and causal interpretation. Our empirical approach allows us to
address these issues to an extent previously impossible. For the House of Representatives in
the 109th to the 112th Congress, we created a panel of legislators’ roll call votes matched to
income-specic policy preferences at the district level, and district-level measures of union
membership, based on digitized administrative records from the Department of Labor.10 Aer
matching information on roll call items for 223,000 CCES respondents to actual roll call votes,
we estimate policy preferences for low and high income constituents in each district for 27
roll calls, adjusting for the fact that that the CCES is not a representative sample of district
populations.
Measuring district preferences by income group
e CCES is an ideal starting point for our analysis, since it is a nationally representative
study, includes a considerable number of roll call questions, and provides us with a large
enough sample size to decompose income-group preferences by district. It largely addresses the
problem that the number of observation in each subgroup dened by income and congressional
district is too low (Bhai and Erikson 2011). e roll calls included in the CCES concern key
votes as identied by Congressional arterly and theWashington Post and cover a broad range
10Our analysis focuses on one apportionment period, which generally holds district boundaries constant (we
show that the results are robust to cases of mid-period redistricting).
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of issues (Ansolabehere and Jones 2010). Respondents are presented with the key wording of
the bill (as used on the oor and in media reports) and are then asked to cast their own vote:
“What about you? If you were faced with this decision would you vote for, against, or not sure?”
Contrary to widely usual agree–disagree survey measures of issue preferences, matched roll
call votes provide us with unequivocal evidence of policy congruence between respondent and
legislator (Jessee 2009, Ansolabehere and Jones 2010: 585). We match 27 roll call items in the
CCES to roll call votes cast in the House of the 109th to 112th Congress. ese cover important
legislative decisions, such as Dodd-Frank, the Aordable Care Act (and aempts to repeal it),
the minimum wage increase, the ratication of the Central America Free Trade Agreement, or
the Lilly Ledbeer Fair Pay Act. Table A.2 in the Appendix lists all matched CCES items and
House bills included in our estimation sample.
e CCES provides a comparatively large sample size per district. However, it is not
designed to be representative for congressional district populations. us, individuals with
certain characteristics, such as particular combinations of income, race and education, may be
underrepresented in the CCES sample of a given district. If this is the case, unadjusted policy
preferences from the CCES will not reect the target population and using them can lead to
biased estimates of unequal representation in Congress.
Our solution to this problem is a small area estimation procedure that rebalances the survey
sample to represent the district population using ne-grained Census data and exible machine
learning tools. e basic idea is to combine the survey data on voter preferences from the
CCES, which may not be representatives of districts, with accurate data on the distribution of
population characteristics in a given district from the Census Bureau’s American Community
Survey (ACS). e machine learning solution we propose is relatively new to the representation
literature in political science. It has aractive properties that merit its application to this topic.
However, our ndings do not depend on this particular approach. We obtain comparable results
when using the MRP approach widely used by political scientists (Lax and Phillips 2009).11
Concretely, we use about 3 million individual-level records from a synthetic sample of
the ACS from 2006 to 2011, which provides an accurate representation of the district popula-
tion. We stack both datasets, creating a structure where we have common district identiers
and individual covariates while responses to policy preference questions are missing in the
Census portion of the data. As common covariates bridging CCES and Census we use the
11Online Appendix B.1 provides a more detailed description of our procedure and Table B.1 reports model results
based on two alternative approaches of measuring preferences: MRP and using raw CCES means. e results
are qualitatively the same as those based on the one presented in the main text. Compared to MRP, our
approach yields somewhat more conservative estimates of the union eect on representation. Not surprisingly,
given concerns about measurement error, eects based on raw means are somewhat smaller.
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following demographic characteristics: gender, race (3 categories), education (5 categories),
age (continuous) and family income (continuous). e laer is of particular relevance as we
are interested in producing district–income group specic preferences. In the next step we ll
missing preferences in the Census with matching data from CCES respondents. Since this is
essentially a prediction problem, we can use powerful tools developed in the machine learning
literature to achieve this task. We use an algorithm proposed by Stekhoven and Bühlmann
(2011) to impute missing cells.12 Compared to commonly used multivariate normal or regres-
sion imputation techniques, this strategy has the advantage that it is fully nonparametric,
allowing for complex interactions between covariates, and deals with both continuous and
categorical data. Our completed data-set now contains preferences for 27 roll call items of
synthetic ‘Census individuals’, which are a representative sample of each House district.
With these data in hand, we assign individuals to income groups and calculate group-
specic preferences for each roll call in each district. Following previous work in the rep-
resentation literature (Bartels 2008, 2016), we delineate low- and high-income respondents
using the 33th and 67th percentile of the distribution of family incomes. Following theories
of constituency representation in Congress and methodological recommendations of Bhai
and Erikson (2011), we specify these income thresholds separately by congressional district.
is accounts for the substantial dierences in both average income and income inequality
between US districts. It also ensures that within each district, income groups are of equal size.
Online Appendix Table A.1 shows the distribution of income-group cutos. On average, our
chosen cutos are close to those used in previous studies. e mean of our district-specic
low-income cutos is around $39,000, while Bartels uses $40,000 (Bartels 2016: 240); our mean
high-income cuto is around $81,000, where Bartels employs a threshold of $80,000. However,
beyond these averages lies considerable variation. In some districts, the 33rd percentile cuto
is as low as $16,500, while the 67th percentile reaches almost $160,000 in others.13
For each roll call, we then estimate district-level preferences of low- and high-income
constituents, which we denote by (θ l ,θh), as the proportion of individuals voting ‘yea’. Since
preference estimates are in [0, 1] they can be directly related to legislators’ probability of
voting ‘yea’ on a given roll call. Our data shows considerable variation in the distance of
the policy preferences of those at the top and those at the boom as illustrated in Figure I. It
plots histograms of the dierence between low-income and high-income preferences (θh − θ l )
in congressional districts for six selected roll calls. For salient bills, such as increasing the
12Honaker and Plutzer (2016) use a similar approach (but rely on multivariate normal imputations) and further
discuss its empirical performance in estimating small area aitudes and preferences.
13Results are relatively invariant to using alternative income thresholds (see Table C.1).
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Figure I
District-level income gap in public support for 6 selected policies
Note: Each histogram plots the dierence in support for a matched roll-call vote question between people in lower
third and people in upper third of their district’s income distribution for all House districts.
minimum wage (the Fair Minimum Wage Act), housing crisis assistance (the Housing and
Economic Recovery Act), or Aordable Care Act, the vast majority of low-income constituents
are more supportive than their high-income counterparts in each and every district. On other
issues, such as the ratication of the Central America Free Trade Agreement, high income
constituents are clearly in favor. In all examples, we nd considerable across-district variation
in the preference gap between low- and high-income constituents.14 We leverage this variation
over both roll calls and districts to estimate legislators’ dierential responsiveness to changes
in policy preferences of dierent income groups, and how it might be moderated by union
strength.
District-level union membership
To measure district-level union membership we draw on ne-grained administrative data
compiled by Becher et al. (2018). Based on the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
14Averaged over all districts and roll calls, there is a statistically signicant gap between the preferences of the
boom third and the top. e mean of the (absolute) preference dierence is 17 percentage points; the 10th
percentile is 3 points while the 90th percentile is 32 percentage points.
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(LMRDA) of 1959, unions have to le mandatory yearly reports (called LM forms) with Oce
of Labor-Management Standards (OLMS). e Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 introduced
a similarly comprehensive system of reporting for federal employees (see Budd 2018). A
mandatory part of each report is the number of members a union has. Failure to report, or
reporting falsied information, is made a criminal oense under the LMRDA, and reports led
by unions are audited by the OLMS. e resulting database contains almost 30,000 local unions.
It is based on 358,051 digitized individual reports that were cleaned, validated, geocoded, and
matched to congressional districts. e number of union members in each congressional district
can then be readily obtained as the sum of all reported union members. Figure II shows the
distribution of union membership in House districts. It demonstrates that there is substantial
variation in unionization between electoral districts even within states, which would be ignored
by a state-level analysis. Note that while individual union locales exhibit signicant variation
in membership over time, aggregate district-level membership moves lile during the period







Union membership in House districts, 109th-112th Congress.
Using LM forms provides important advantages over using measures derived from surveys.
First, mandatory administrative lings are likely more reliable than population surveys, which
oen suer from over-reporting and unit-nonresponse (Southworth and Stepan-Norris 2009:
311). Second, they allow us to estimate union membership numbers for smaller geographical
units, which are usually unavailable in population surveys or only covered with insucient
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sample sizes.15 Another advantage for the study of politics is that the presence of union locales
is observable to politicians on the ground even in the absence of survey data.
A potential drawback of using LM forms is that some public unions (those that exclusively
represent state, county, or municipal government employees) are exempt from ling. However,
any union that covers at least one private sector employee is required to le. In practice, this
leads to almost complete coverage, because unions are now increasingly organizing workers
across dierent sectors and occupations (Lichtenstein 2013: 249).16
Basic Empirical Models
e fact that we observe several roll calls within a given congressional district allows us to
specify a statistical model with district xed eects, which capture unobservable characteristics
of districts (and states) that are constant over roll-calls. To provide for a stricter test of
the moderating eect of unions, we also allow a rich set of other district characteristics to
moderate the link between income groups and legislators’ voting behavior. is amounts to
estimating models including interactions between observed district characteristics and group
preferences. Later, we introduce an instrumental variable for union membership and a more
general statistical model that makes less restrictive assumptions.
For each roll call vote j (j = 1, . . . , J ), we have measured preferences of low and high





of (logged) union membership in a district is denoted byUd . We specify relevant confounders
in Xd . Depending on the particular specication (discussed in the next section) these will
include (i) socio-economic district characteristics, (ii) measures of historical state union policies
and state xed eects, (iii) proxies for district-level social capital, (iv) as well as non-linear
transformations of these. For ease of interpretation, we have scaled all inputs to have mean
zero and unit standard deviation. Our model for the voting behavior of House members is the
15e most prominent data set on union membership, compiled by Hirsch et al. (2001), provides CPS-based
estimates for states and metropolitan statistical areas; district identiers are not available.
16National aggregates based on LM forms are in close agreement with measures from the CPS (Hirsch et al.
2001): the former estimates 13.21 million union members (excluding Washington, D.C.) while the laer yields
15.22 million. is dierence is consistent with some degree of over-reporting in the (survey-based) CPS
(Southworth and Stepan-Norris 2009: 311). It can also be interpreted as an upper bound for the non-coverage
of some public sector unions. A more detailed analysis (Becher et al. 2018) nds that state-level aggregates
from LM forms and the CPS are strongly correlated (r = 0.86).
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following linear probability specication:
yijd =µ
lθ ljd + µ
hθhjd + η
l (Ud × θ ljd) + ηh(Ud × θhjd)+
βl (Xd × θ ljd) + βh(Xd × θhjd) + αd + ϵijd
e key terms here are the interactions between union membership and the respective pref-
erences of the auent and the poor, Udθhjd and Udθ
l
jd
. us, when ηl and ηh are zero the
group-specic preference coecients µl and µh indicate the change in the probability of leg-
islators casting a supportive vote induced by a standard deviation change in the respective
preferences of the poor and the auent. e coecient ηl indicates the conditional eect of a
standard deviation change in logged union membership on the responsiveness of legislators’
votes to the preferences of the poor. e corresponding eect for the auent is given by ηh .
Our theoretical expectation is that ηl > 0 and ηh ≤ 0.
In order to mitigate the inuence of unobserved confounders aecting legislators’ voting
behavior, we account for time-constant district-level unobservables by including district xed
eects, αd .17 Despite this, one may be worried that changes in responsiveness aributed to
unions are spurious. As a conceptually straightforward approach to rule out further alternative
explanations, we include the interactions between controls (both on the district- and state-level)
and group preferences Xdθ ljd and Xdθ
h
jd
. ey use within-district variation over roll-calls and
preferences to estimate the conditional marginal eect of group preferences, making it less likely
that our estimated eect of union membership is simply due to omied confounders. Finally, ϵijd
are white-noise errors assumed independent of covariates. We account for heteroscedasticity
and arbitrary within-district correlations when calculating standard errors.
Results
Before presenting evidence on the moderating eect of unions, we want to give a sense
of the overall picture of legislators’ responsiveness emerging from our data. Estimating a
model as described above with district xed eects but without accounting for local union
organization (seing βl , βh and ηl , ηh to zero) or any other moderators, we nd a clear gap in
the responsiveness of legislators to the preferences of low- versus high-income individuals. A
standard deviation (SD) increase in the preferences of the auent is linked to an increase in
17Note that non-interacted eects of district-level union membership and covariates (which vary between districts,
but are constant over roll calls) are absorbed in αd .
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the probability of legislators to cast a corresponding vote of 13.6 (±1.2) percentage points. In
contrast, a SD increase in the preferences of the less well-o induces a much smaller change
in legislators’ behavior of 1.6 (±1.4) points. With a condence interval ranging from −1.1 to
4.4, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that legislators do not respond to the preferences of
low-income constituents in the average electoral district. e responsiveness gap between the
two groups is sizable (at 11.9 (±2.5) percentage points) and signicantly dierent from zero.
is is consistent with with previous work on unequal representation in Congress (Bartels
2008, 2016; Bhai and Erikson 2011; Ellis 2013). Next, we show that the extent of legislators’
non-responsiveness depends crucially on the strength of local unions.
Turning to the eect of unions on legislative responsiveness, we start by summarizing
our key nding graphically and then discuss more extensive model specications. Figure III
plots marginal eects of low- and high-income constituency preferences on representatives’
roll-call votes at varying levels of union membership with 95% condence intervals.18 It shows
that legislators’ responsiveness to the policy preferences and low-income and high-income
constituents depends on district-level union membership: as unionization increases, legislators’
responsiveness to low-income constituents increases, while their responsiveness to high-income
constituents declines by a similar amount. For example, moving from a district with median
levels of union membership to one at the 75th percentile increases the responsiveness of
legislators to low-income preferences by 8 percentage points, while it decreases responsiveness
to high-income preferences by about 5 points. Given the initial responsiveness gap, this change
is substantial enough to substantially level the playing eld between auent and poor.
Are these ndings robust to confounding factors? Table I presents parameter estimates
from a number of increasingly rich specications designed to capture potential confounds. In
specication (1), we begin with a baseline model (also ploed in Figure III) that includes district
xed eects but no further preferences-confounder interactions (seing βl and βh to zero). We
nd that a SD increase in district union membership increases legislators’ responsiveness to
the poor by about 11 (±1) percentage points, while at the same time decreasing the advantage
in responsiveness enjoyed by the auent by about 6 (±1) points.
Even aer accounting for district xed eects, alternative explanations for this result
may be based on omied variables that interact with group preferences. Reecting policy
feedback (Ahlquist 2017), the moderating eect we have ascribed to unions mostly reects
the fact that state governments have chosen policies that strengthen or weaken the ability of
unions to organize. While collective action problems dilute incentives of politicians to make
18Calculated from a LPM of vote choice on preferences and union membership. It includes district xed eects
with district-clustered standard errors. See also specication (1) in Table I below.
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Figure III
District-level union membership as moderator of unequal representation.
Note: is gure plots changes in marginal eects of low- and high-income constituency preferences on represen-
tatives’ roll-call votes conditional on district-level union membership. Shaded areas are 95% condence intervals
based on district-clustered standard errors. e sample distribution of (z-standardized) union membership is
indicated above the x-axis.
politics using policies, in some circumstances they are overcome. Most relevant for unions are
right-to-work and public sector bargaining laws (Anzia and Moe 2016; Feigenbaum et al. 2018;
Flavin and Hartney 2015; Hacker and Pierson 2010; Hertel-Fernandez 2018). In specication
(2), we therefore add two measures of historical state union policy: the share of years with
right-to-work legislation and the share of years with mandatory collective bargaining laws for
teachers since 1955, taken from Flavin and Hartney (2015). ese enter Xd and are interacted
with income group preferences θ l and θh . In specication (3) we go one step further and allow
for any state-level characteristic (such as institutions or historically-rooted popular anti-union
sentiments) to moderate the marginal eect of income group preferences on legislators vote
choice by including state-specic constants in Xd which are interacted with group preferences.
e results from both extended specications show that accounting for state-level policies and
institutions as potential moderators does not change our core picture of the role of local union
organization: where local unions are stronger the responsiveness gap between the auent and
the poor is reduced.
A more subtle problem concerns a form of simultaneity bias at the district level. ere may
be district-level factors shaping both the propensity to be a union member and to be politically
15
Table I
Union strength and representation. Eect of union membership on legislators’
responsiveness to income groups.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low income preferences 0.106 0.082 0.098 0.108 0.068 0.045
(0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
High income preferences −0.063 −0.036 −0.053 −0.066 −0.050 −0.028
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
District xed eects X X X X X X
Group preferences
× union policy X X
× state constants X
× district social capital X X
× district covariates X X
Note: N=15,780. Nd = 435. 27 roll call votes, 109th to 112th Congress. Entries are parameter estimates for ηl and ηh
from a linear probability model with district-clustered standard errors in parentheses. All models include district xed
eects. Specications (2) to (5) include coecients for interaction (β l , βh ) of income group preferences with state- or
district-level confounders. Specication (2) includes two measures of historical state union policymaking, the share of
years with right-to-work legislation and collective bargaining agreements. (3) interacts preferences with state xed ef-
fects. (4) includes a social capital index (Rupasingha and Goetz 2008). (5) includes a large set of district-level characteris-
tics (population size, degree of urbanization, shares of female, Black, Hispanic, BA degrees, employed in manufacturing,
as well as median household income). Specication (6) includes all of the previously described measured variables.
active. If less auent individuals with a higher capacity to organize and solve collective action
problems cluster in specic districts, our estimates of the marginal impact of district union
membership on responsiveness will be overly optimistic. Such a propensity may reect critical
historical junctures in labor organizations (Ahlquist and Levy 2013) or social capital (Putnam
1993, 2000).
As a rst cut to address this problem using control variables, we add proxies tapping into
social capital. e social capital index developed by Rupasingha and Goetz (2008) captures
broader paerns of organizational and community life. It combines information on membership
in voluntary associations, voter turnout, the Census response rate, and the number of non-
prot organizations. e index is available at the county level and was spatially reweighted
to congressional districts. e components of the index are measured contemporaneously
with unionization and at least some of them (i.e., turnout) are potentially a consequence of
union strength. Hence we interpret specication (4), which interacts voter preferences and
district-level social capital, as a conservative test for the impact of unions. It makes clear that
net of social capital, which may itself reect prior union strength, district unionization shapes
responsiveness: a SD increase in union membership still increases legislators’ responsiveness
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to the preferences of the poor by 6 (±1) percentage points, and lowers their responsiveness
to the preferences of the auent. Moreover, using alternative measures of social capital, the
number bowling alleys and the number of congregations per 1000 inhabitants, yields the same
result (see Appendix E).
In specication (5) we measure a large number of districts’ socio-economic characteristics
and allow them to interact with constituency preferences: population size, race (share of
African Americans and Hispanics), education (share with BA or higher), the share of the
working population employed in manufacturing, median household income, and the degree of
urbanization (for descriptive statistics, see Table A.3). is set of covariates excludes obviously
“bad controls” (Samii 2016) such as partisanship or campaign contributions that are a mechanism
through which unions inuence representation.19 Again, our results point towards the existence
of a clear moderating eect of unions. Our nal specication, column (6) of Table I, includes
all previous covariates and, again, conrms our core nding.20
Assessing Threats to Inference
So far our analysis has relied on district xed eects and covariates interacted with prefer-
ences to rule out alternative explanations for the pro-poor, egalitarian impact of unions. Now
we move to identication of the union eect based on an instrumental variable (IV) approach
and a general selection model. ey enable us to rule out alternative explanations based on
unobservable omied variables and relax functional form assumptions.
We instrument contemporary union density by exploiting the history and geography of the
post-war labor movement in the United States. As proposed by Becher and Stegmueller (2019),
the basic idea is to leverage the history of spillovers from unionization in a few capital-intensive
industries, whose location was mainly determined by geographical factors, such as natural
endowments, as opposed to local tastes or institutions. In the early 1950s coal and metal mines
as well as steel plants were fully unionized across the country, irrespective of local political
leanings (Holmes 2006: 2). In the environment of the time, extractive industries were easy
targets for unionization due to their capital intensity, high sunk costs, and dicult working
19Unionization may also lead to sorting based on sociodemographic characteristics if people vote with their feet.
Hence, our basic model excludes these factors, and the next section species an instrumental variable model.
20Additional robustness checks reported in Appendix E conrm these results (e.g., excluding states with redis-
tricting or districts with extreme preferences, using alternative measures of social capital, accounting for
errors-in-variables). Becher et al. (2018) nd that union concentration can aect legislative voting. While we
have not source of exogenous variation for their concentration variable, our results obtain when controlling
for it (see Table E.1).
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conditions. us, they were unionized even in the otherwise much more anti-union South.
Importantly, the location of mining and even steel production is largely determined by nature,
whether due to the availability of coal in the ground or the access to raw materials for steel
mills. is means that the post-war level unionization in these industries is largely orthogonal
to local factors.
Over time, positive spillovers from unionized mining and steel industries induced high
levels of union membership across industries. Unions used their resources to organize new
establishments, and workers switching industries brought with them tastes and skills for
unionization. Using detailed local data, Holmes (2006) documents a positive relationship
between the unionization of establishments (in health care and wholesale) in the 1990s and
their proximity to mining and metal industries in the 1950s.
e combination of geographic location determined by nature and spillovers implies that
part of the variation in union membership in congressional districts at the beginning of the
twenty-rst century is exogenous to local factors conditional on the intensity of mining and
steel employment in the middle of the twentieth century. We need to assume that historical
unionization in these capital-intensive sectors only aects contemporary political representa-
tion through contemporary unionization. We think this is a plausible approximation. Today,
for instance, neither mining nor steel are uniformly unionized.21
We thus construct our instrument for current levels of union membership from data on
district-level employment shares in mining and steel industries in the 1950s. We construct
the laer by calculating them from 1950 Census samples spatially interpolated to current
congressional districts.22 Figure IV conveys that historical mining employment is strongly
related to contemporary levels of union membership. It plots logged district-level employment
in mining and steel industries (as share of working population) in the 1950 Census against
logged contemporary district-level union membership in the 109th Congress. A simple linear
model with state xed eects suggests that a one percent increase in the instrument induces a
0.34 (±0.04) percent increase in the district-level share of union members. State xed eects
21One possible violation of the exclusion restriction is that initial unionization in capital-intensive industries also
fostered other institutions or organizations that represent low income groups. While we cannot rule this out
completely, recall that our results are robust to adjusting for various alternative moderators, including social
capital, churches, policies, and state xed eects (see Table I and Table E.1) and to using a general selection
model (below), which does not require this assumption.
22We use IPUMS 1 percent 1950 Census samples which use ‘state economic areas’ (SEA) as geographic identiers.
We create area-weighted crosswalks from SEAs to current congressional districts via spatial polygon intersec-























































































































































































































































































































































































Instrumenting union density with post-war mining/steel industry employment
is Figure plots logged district-level employment in mining and steel industries (as share of working population)
in 1950 against logged contemporary district-level union density. 109th Congress. Linear t with robust 95%
condence interval superimposed.
capture variation in pro-business orientation of state in the 1950s, whichmay shape the intensity
of mining or the location of steel industries.
Column (1) of Table II shows IV estimates for the eect of union strength on the link
between preferences and legislative voting.23 A SD increase in unionization increases legislators’
responsiveness to the poor by about 8 (±1) percentage points and decreases responsiveness to
the upper third by about 5 (±1) points. Our IV estimate lies within the set of estimates reported
in Table I. In line with the discussion above, the F-statistic of 639.6 provides evidence of a
strong rst stage relationship. ese results considerably strengthen the causal interpretation
of our ndings.
Another approach to address the problem of union endogeneity is to use the post-double-
selection estimator recently developed in econometrics (Belloni et al. 2014; Chernozhukov et al.
2015). It makes dierent assumptions than the IV approach but aims to recover the same causal
eect, and thus ensures that our causal interpretation does not solely rely on the validity of a
single approach.
23Formally, the 2SLS model instruments the two preference-union interaction terms in the estimation equation,
Ud × θ ljd andUd × θhjd , usingMd,1950 × θ ljd andMd,1950 × θhjd , whereMd,1950 is the historical stock of mining
and steel employment from the 1950 census in contemporary district d .
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Table II
Probing the Causal Eect of Union Membership on




Low income preferences 0.076 0.063 0.058
(0.012) (0.014) (0.017)
High Income preferences −0.052 −0.054 −0.038
(0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
Semi-parametric terms 144 264
Post-LASSO terms 18 31
First-stage F statistic 639.6
N 15674 7884 7813
Note: Table entries are estimates for ηL and ηH (robust s.e. in parentheses).
a Column 1 reports instrumental variable (2SLS) estimates. Union density instru-
mented with district mining employment share in 1950. First-stage F statistic is
Kleibergen-Paap weak IV statistic.
b Post-double-selection estimates. See Appendix F for details. N=7,884 (50% valida-
tion sample, rst half used for selection). Column (2) includes district characteristics
in both linear and quadratic form and all their pairwise interactions; (3) adds union
policy and social capital terms.
e post-double-selection estimator constructs a high-dimensional vector of controls from
functional transforms of observables and their higher order interactions. It thus creates a
partially linear model (Robinson 1988) using controls without the functional form restrictions
usually imposed in regression models. It then estimates equations for both roll call votes and
the interaction of union membership and preferences (including the set of high dimensional
controls in all of them). Out of the large number of terms it selects confounders that predict
both preferences and roll call votes using the LASSO. e selected set of covariates is used in
a post-LASSO estimation step to account for the most relevant confounders. is estimator
has low bias and yields accurate condence intervals even under moderate selection mistakes
(Belloni et al. 2014). Responsible for its robustness property is the step selecting the control set
from all model equations. It nds controls whose omission leads to “large” omied variable
bias and includes them in the model. Any variables that are not included are therefore at most
mildly associated with union density, district preferences, and the outcome, which decidedly
limits the scope of omied variable bias (Chernozhukov et al. 2015). Appendix F provides more
details.
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e results are in Table II. In specication (2) we include all district variables, their pairwise
interactions and their interactions with district preferences, all in both linear and quadratic form.
is leads to a vector of 144 covariate terms. In specication (3) we extend the set of possible
controls and additionally include union policy variables and ourmeasure of social capital leaving
us with 264 controls. As the last line of Table II shows, the estimator selects a subset of these
producing more exible model specications with the number of included controls being 18
and 31. Again, we nd that increasing unionization positively aects the representation of low-
income constituents. A SD increase in union membership increases legislators’ responsiveness
to low-income preferences by about 6 percentage points, while decreasing the responsiveness
to the preferences of the auent by about 4 points. e magnitude of the post-double selection
estimates is in line with the IV results and the estimates we obtained in the richer specications
of our previous linear model (compare specications (4) and (5) in Table I).24
Exploring Mechanisms
In this nal empirical section, we explore two mechanisms of union inuence: campaign
contributions and partisan selection.25 If contributions are a channel of union inuence, we
expect to observe that (i) in districts where local unions are stronger, unions and their members
contribute more to siing members of Congress; and (ii) that these contributions are positively
linked to legislative responsiveness. If partisan selection is a relevant channel, (i) district-level
union strength should have a positive impact on electing Democratic legislators, (ii) who in
turn are more likely to vote in line with low-income preferences.
In a rst step, we analyze the impact of union membership on the amount of (logged) labor
contributions and selection of Democratic legislators. Ourmeasure of contributions is calculated
from raw campaign nance contribution data obtained from the Center for Responsive Politics.
We sum contributions reported to the Federal Election Commission to candidates from the
“labor” sector (excluding single-issue donations). Our count includes both individuals and PACs
(but using either alone does not change our results). To guard against omied variables, we
24We also investigated if our ndings are dependent on the linear functional form imposed on the union-
preference interaction terms. In a recent replication survey, Hainmueller et al. (2019) warn that “a large
portion of published ndings based on multiplicative interaction models are artifacts of misspecication.” In
Appendix G we show evidence that the moderating eect of unions is evident even in a nonparametric KRLS
model without any a priori restrictions.
25Turnout is a related mechanism analyzed in the literature (e.g. Bartels 2008; Franko et al. 2016; Gilens 2012;
Leighley and Oser 2018). While evidently important, for our purposes we prefer campaign contributions
because they are clearly a choice variable related to maintaining a credible mobilization threat. Realized
aggregate turnout, in contrast, depends more on idiosyncratic factors.
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apply the instrumental variable strategy from above. Table III shows the results. In columns
(1) - (3), we nd that under OLS and IV specications (with and without district controls) an
increase in union membership systematically increases the amount of contributions from labor
in that district. Consistent with some degree of endogeneity, the estimate from the IV models
is about twice as large as the one from the OLS model. According to model (2) and converted
to Dollar amounts, a standard deviation increase in union membership increases contributions
from Labor by about $178,500. Turning to partisan selection, columns (4) - (6) support the
argument that higher union membership entails a higher probability of a Democratic candidate
being elected.
Table III
Exploring Mechanisms, rst step. e impact of union membership on the amount
of labor contributions and selection of Democratic legislators.
A: Contributions B: Selection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
Union membership 0.072 0.120 0.147 0.158 0.123 0.204
(0.010) (0.029) (0.030) (0.019) (0.055) (0.053)
First-stage F statistic 87.6 28.2 87.6 28.2
District-level controls X X
Note: Panel A show district-level regression of (log) labor contributions on (log) union membership. Panel B shows
district-level LPMs of presence of Democratic representative on (log) union membership. Columns (2) and (5) instru-
ment union density with district mining employment share in 1950. Kleibergen-Paap robust rst-stage F statistic. Ro-
bust standard errors are in parentheses.
In a second step, we analyze the link between campaign contributions and unequal re-
sponsiveness as well as partisanship and unequal responsiveness. Table IV shows the results.
Following the specication used in Table I, we estimate linear probability models regressing roll
call votes on contributions interacted with constituency preferences, district xed eects, and,
in column (2), district covariates interacted with preferences. We nd that in districts where
labor contributions are higher, the marginal eect capturing a legislator’s responsiveness to
the preferences of low income constituents is signicantly higher. Consistent with previous
research (Bartels 2016; Rhodes and Schaner 2017), the selection of Democratic legislators
is also associated with higher responsiveness to the preferences of low income constituents
compared to their Republican counterparts.
In sum, the pro-poor impact of unions rests in part on their ability to mobilize campaign
contributions and geing Democratic candidates elected. is is consistent with arguments
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based on mobilization threats and rational politicians. While intuitive, these results are by no
means mechanical. National union organizations play an important role in lobbying Congress
and their political resources need not be directed where unions’ grassroots are strongest (Dark
1999). e evidence that district-level union membership nonetheless maers for legislative
responsiveness is consistent with the argument that local union strength underpins a credible
threat of mobilization that shapes political equality through political selection and post-electoral
incentives. e importance of electoral selection visible in our results is in line with a larger
body of research on elections and representation (Bartels 2016; Lee et al. 2004; Miller and Stokes
1963). Mobilization eorts by unions remain strongly linked to available human resources
on the ground. Recent evidence also shows that the presence of local unions is linked to the
perceptions of constituent preferences by congressional staers (Hertel-Fernandez et al. 2019).
Table IV
Exploring Mechanisms, second step. Roll call votes
as function of preferences moderated by labor
contributions and Democratic legislators.
(1) (2)
A: Labor contributions
× low income preferences 0.946 0.933
(0.036) (0.032)
× high income preferences -0.735 -0.754
(0.029) (0.028)
B:Democratic representative
× low income preferences 0.576 0.561
(0.012) (0.013)
× high income preferences -0.411 -0.431
(0.013) (0.013)
District-level controls X
Note: Entries are coecients from LPMs of legislators’ vote as func-
tion of interaction between district preferences and (log) labor contri-
butions (panel A) and Democratic representative (panel B). Column (2)
adds district-level controls interacted with preferences. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses.
Analyzing the heterogeneity of the impact of unions also sheds light on the mechanisms.
For reasons of space, we relegate the complete discussion to Online Appendix H. We nd that
our results do not vary much by the type of the union (public or private) or whether the vote
concerns a liberal or conservative position. However, the impact of union membership on
legislators’ responsiveness to low-income preferences is signicantly larger for roll call votes
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on which the AFL-CIO has taken an a prior position. is bolsters the interpretation that the
egalitarian eect of unions is driven by their capacity for political action.
Conclusion
Dahl (1961) famously asked: who governs in a polity where political rights are equally
distributed, but where large inequalities in income and wealth may bias representation? In the
wake of rising income inequality in the US, scholars have identied the question of political
inequality as one of the central challenges facing democracy in the twenty-rst century (APSA
2004). While the scientic debate is ongoing, a growing number of studies has documented
striking paerns of unequal responsiveness by income. When policy preferences diverge across
income groups, legislators are biased toward the auent at the expense of the middle-class
and—especially—the poor. Many recent works conclude by asking what factors may improve
political representation of the economically disadvantaged.
We contribute to this agenda by analyzing whether labor unions can serve as an eective
collective voice institution that limits unequal representation in Congress. Going beyond
existing work on this topic, we develop a research design to account for the fact that union
strength is endogenous to politics. It is based on district xed eects, rich data on alternative
moderators of income-group preferences, and a instrumental variable approach. Against the
view that unions are not relevant causal forces for political equality, we nd that the district-
level strength curbs unequal representation. While legislators are, on average, more responsive
to the preferences of the auent than to the preferences of the poor, this representation gap is
highly variable. It is much less pronounced in districts where union membership is relatively
higher.
Our ndings cast a somewhat less pessimistic light on democratic representation in
Congress. Despite high income inequality, polarization, expensive campaigns, and a leg-
islature dominated by auent politicians (Carnes 2013; Gilens 2012; Hacker and Pierson 2010;
McCarty et al. 2006), they suggest that legislative underrepresentation of the poor is not an
unavoidable feature of democracy in America. ese results encourage research on public
opinion and representation in the US to pay more aention to unions. Our research echoes
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A. Data
In this appendix we present additional details on our dataset including details on the creation
of some control variables and descriptive statistics.
Matched roll calls Table A.2 displays Congressional roll calls matched to CCES items. We selected
congressional roll calls based on content and, when several choices were available, based on their
proximity to CCES eldwork periods.
Income thresholds Table A.1 presents an overview of the income thresholds we use to classify
CCES respondents into income groups. We use two thresholds separating the lowest and highest
income terciles. We calculate them from yearly American Community Survey les excluding
individuals living in group quarters. For each congress, Table A.1 shows the average of all
district-specic thresholds as well as the smallest and largest ones.
Public unions Public unions captured (by name) in our data include the American Federation
of State, County & Municipal Employees, National Education Association, American Federation
of Teachers, American Federation of Government Employees, National Association of Govern-
ment Employees, United Public Service Employees Union, National Treasury Employees Union,
American Postal Workers Union, National Association of Leer Carriers, Rural Leer Carriers
Association, National Postal Mail Handlers Union, National Alliance of Postal and Federal Employ-
ees, Patent Oce Professional Association, National Labor Relations Board Union, International
Association of Fire Fighters, Fraternal Order of Police, National Association of Police Organizations,
various local police associations, and various local public school unions.
Table A.1
Distribution of district income-group reference points. Average
threshold over all districts, smallest and largest value.
33th percentile 67th percentile
Congress Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
109 38123 16800 73675 77964 39612 146870
110 40127 18000 77000 83047 43600 155113
111 39021 17500 78262 82440 46000 160050
112 37381 16500 81000 79868 38500 158654
Note: Calculated from American Community Survey 1-year les. Household sample excluding
group quarters. Missing income information imputed using Chained Random Forests.
1
Table A.2
Matched CCES–House roll calls included in our analysis.
Match Bill Date Name House Vote Bill
(Yea-Nay) Ideology†
(1) HR 810 07/19/2006 Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act (Presidential Veto override) 235-193 L
(1) HR 3 01/11/2007 Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2007 (House) 253-174 L
(1) S 5 06/07/2007 Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2007 247-176 L
(2) HR 2956 07/12/2007 Responsible Redeployment from Iraq Act 223-201 L
(3) HR 2 01/10/2007 Fair Minimum Wage Act 315-116 L
(4) HR 4297 12/08/2005 Tax Relief Extension Reconciliation Act (Passage) 234-197 C
(4) HR 4297 05/10/2006 Tax Relief Extension Reconciliation Act (Agreeing to Conference Report) 244-185 C
(5) HR 3045 07/28/2005 Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act
217-215 C
(6) S 1927 08/04/2007 Protect America Act 227-183 C
(6) HR 6304 06/20/2008 FISA Amendments Act of 2008 293-129 C
(7) HR 3162 08/01/2007 Children’s Health and Medicare Protection Act 225-204 L
(7) HR 976 10/18/2007 Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act (Presidential Veto
Override)
273-156 L
(7) HR 3963 01/23/2008 Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act (Presidential Veto
Override)
260-152 L
(7) HR 2 02/04/2009 Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act 290-135 L
(8) HR 3221 07/23/2008 Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008 272-152 L
(9) HR 3688 11/08/2007 United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement 285-132 C
(10) HR 1424 10/03/2008 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 263-171 L
(11) HR 3080 10/12/2011 To implement the United States-Korea Trade Agreement 278-151 C
(12) HR 3078 10/12/2011 To implement the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement 262-167 C
(13) HR 2346 06/16/2009 Supplemental Appropriations, Fiscal Year 2009 (Agreeing to conference re-
port)
226-202 L
(14) HR 2831 07/31/2007 Lilly Ledbeer Fair Pay Act 225-199 L
(14) HR 11 01/09/2009 Lilly Ledbeer Fair Pay Act of 2009 (House) 247-171 L
(14) S 181 01/27/2009 Lilly Ledbeer Fair Pay Act of 2009 250-177 L
(15) HR 1913 04/29/2009 Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act 249-175 L
(16) HR 1 02/13/2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Agreeing to Conference
Report)
246-183 L
(17) HR 2454 06/26/2009 American Clean Energy and Security Act 219-212 L
(18) HR 3590 03/21/2010 Patient Protection and Aordable Care Act 220-212 L
(19) HR 3962 11/07/2009 Aordable Health Care for America Act 221-215 L
(20) HR 4173 06/30/2010 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009 237-192 L
(21) HR 2965 12/15/2010 Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010 250-175 L
(22) S 365 08/01/2011 Budget Control Act of 2011 269-161 C
(23) H CR 34 04/15/2011 House Budget Plan of 2011 235-193 C
(24) H CR 112 03/28/2012 Simpson-Bowles/Copper Amendment to House Budget Plan 38-382 C
(25) HR 8 08/01/2012 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (Levin Amendment) 170-257 L
(26) HR 2 01/19/2011 Repealing the Job-Killing Health Care Law Act 245-189 C
(26) HR 6079 07/11/2012 Repeal the Patient Protection and Aordable Care Act and [. . . ] 244-185 C
(27) HR 1938 07/26/2011 North American-Made Energy Security Act 279-147 C
Note: e matching of roll calls to CCES items can be many-to-one.




Descriptive statistics of analysis sample
Mean SD Min Max N
Roll-call vote: yea 0.568 0.495 0.000 1.000 15780
Constituent preferences
Low income 0.593 0.220 0.047 0.979 15934
High income 0.555 0.198 0.037 0.967 15934
Low-High Gap 0.172 0.121 0.000 0.588 15934
Union membership [log] 9.705 1.046 6.094 13.619 15934
Population 7.022 0.723 4.697 9.980 15934
Share African American 0.124 0.146 0.004 0.680 15934
Share Hispanic 0.156 0.174 0.005 0.812 15934
Share BA or higher 0.275 0.097 0.073 0.645 15934
Median income [$10,000] 5.177 1.356 2.282 10.439 15934
Share female 0.508 0.010 0.462 0.543 15934
Manufacturing share 0.110 0.047 0.025 0.281 15934
Urbanization 0.790 0.199 0.213 1.000 15934
Social capital index -0.675 0.758 -2.688 2.136 15789
Certication elections [log] 3.347 0.861 0.000 5.100 15934
Congregations [per 1000 persons] 0.765 1.147 0.062 6.453 15934
Note: Calculated from American Community Survey, 2006-2013. Note that when entered in models, variables
are scaled to mean zero and unit SD. Preference gap is absolute dierence in preferences between low
and high income constituents in sample. Urbanization is calculated as the share of the district population
living in an urban area based on the Census’ denition of urban Census blocks (matched to congressional
districts using the MABLE database). Congregations per 1000 inhabitants calculated from RCMS 2000
(spatially interpolated).
Descriptive statistics Table A.3 shows descriptive statistics for all variables used in our analysis.
Note that these are for the untransformed variables. In our empirical models, we standardize all
inputs to have mean zero and unit standard deviation.
B. Estimation of District Preferences
In this section we describe how we estimate district-level preferences using three dierent
strategies: (i) small area estimation using a matching approach based on random forests (which we
use in the main text of our paper), (ii) estimation using multilevel regression and post-stratication
(MRP), and (iii) unadjusted cell means. Each approach invokes dierent statistical and substantive
assumptions. In the spirit of consilience, our aim here is to show that our substantive results do
not depend on any particular choice.
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B.1. Small Area Estimation via Chained Random Forests
e core idea of our small area estimation strategy is based on the fact that we have access to
two samples: one that is likely not representative of the population of all Congressional districts
(the CCES), while the second one is representative of district populations by virtue of its sampling
design (the Census or American Community Survey). By matching or imputing preferences from
the former to the laer based on a common vector of observable individual characteristics, we
can use the district-representative sample to estimate the preferences of individuals in a given
district.1
Combining CCES and Census data using Random Forests Figure B.1 illustrates this approach
in more detail. We have data from m individuals in the CCES and n individuals in the Census
(with n m). Both sets of individuals share K common characteristics Zk , such as age, race, or
education. e rst task at hand is then to match P roll call preferencesYp that are only observed in
the CCES to the census sample. is is a purely predictive task and it is thus well suited for machine
learning approaches. We use random forests (Breiman 2001) to lean about Yp = f (Z1, . . . ,ZK ) for
p = 1, . . . , P using the algorithm proposed by Stekhoven and Bühlmann (2011). is approach has
two key advantages. First, as is typical for approaches based on regression trees, it deals with both
categorical and continuous data, allows for arbitrary functional forms, and can include higher
order interactions between covariates (such as age×race×education). Second, we can assess the
quality of the predictions based on our model before we deploy it to predict preferences in the
Census. With the trained model in hand we can use f̂ (Z1, . . . ,ZK ) in combination with observed
Z in the Census sample to ll in preferences (i.e., completing the square in the lower right of
Figure B.1). Using the completed Census data, we can estimate constituent district preferences as
simple averages by district and income group since the Census sample is representative for each
Congressional district’s population.
Data details Due to data condentially constraints the Census Bureau does not provide district
identiers in its micro-data records. Instead, it identies 630 Public Use Microdata areas. We
create a synthetic Census sample for Congressional districts by sampling individuals from the full
Census PUMA regions proportional to their relative share in a given districts. is information is
based on a crosswalk from PUMA regions to Congressional districts created by recreating one
from the other based on Census tract level population data in the MABLE Geocorr2K database.
e ‘donor pool’ for this synthetic sample are the 1% extracts for the American Community Survey
2006-2011. We limit the sample to non-group quarter households and to individuals aged 17
1See Honaker and Plutzer (2016) for a more explicit exposition of this idea, evidence for its empirical reliability, and
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Illustration of Small Area Estimation of District Preferences.
We use a sample of m individuals from the CCES that is not necessarily representative on the district-level, while a
sample of n individuals from the Census is representative of district populations by design (Torrieri et al. 2014: Ch.4).
We have access to bridging covariates Zk that are common to both samples, while roll call preferences Yp are only
observed in the CCES. We train a exible non-parametric model relating Yp to Z and use it to predict preferences Y ∗p
for Census individuals with characteristics Z . With preference values lled in, a district’s income-group specic roll
call preference can be estimated as the average of all units in that district.
and older providing us with data on 14 million (13,711,248) Americans. From this we create the
synthetic district le which is comprised of 3,040,265 cases. is provides us with a Census sample
including Congressional district identiers. e sample for each district is representative of the
district population (save for errors induced by the crosswalk). We thus use the distribution of
important population characteristics (age, gender, education, race, income) to match data on policy
preferences from the CCES.
We harmonize all covariates to be comparable between CCES and Census. For family income
this entails an adjustment to the measure provided in the CCES. It asks respondents to place their
family’s total household income into 14 income bins.2 We transform this discretized measure of
income into a continuous one using a nonparametric midpoint Pareto estimator. It replaces each
bin with its midpoint (e.g., the third category $20,000 to $29,999 gets assigned $25,000), while
the value for the nal, open-ended, bin is imputed from a Pareto distribution (e.g., Kopczuk et al.
2010). Using midpoints has been recognized for some time as an appropriate way to create scores
for income categories (without making explicit distributional modeling assumptions). ey have
2e exact question wording is: “inking back over the last year, what was your family’s annual income?” e
obvious issue here is that it is not clear which income concept this refers to (or, rather, which on the respondent
employs). In line with the wording used in many other US surveys, we interpret it as referring to market income.
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been used extensively, for example, in the American politics literature analyzing General Social
Survey (GSS) data (Hout 2004).
Algorithm details For easier exposition dene a matrix D that contains both individual charac-
teristics and roll call preferences. Let N be the number of rows of D. For any given variable v of
D, Dv , with missing entries at locations i(v)mis ⊆ {1, . . . ,N } we can separate out four parts:3
• Observed values of Dv : denoted as y(v)obs
• Missing values of Dv : y(v)mis





• Variables other than Dv with observations i(v)mis : x
(v)
mis
We now cycle through variables iteratively ing random forest and lling in unobserved values
until a stopping criterion c (indicating no further change in lled-in values) is met. Algorithmically,
we proceed as follows:
Algorithm 1 Chained Random Forests
1: Start with initial guesses of missing values in D
2: w ← vector of column indices sorted by increasing fraction of NA
3: while not c do
4: Dimp
old
← previously imputed D
5: for v in w do




7: Predict y(v)mis using x
(v)
mis
8: Dimpnew ← updated imputed matrix using predicted y(v)mis
9: Updated stopping criterion c
10: Return completed Dimp
To assess the quality of this scheme, we inspect the prediction error of the random forests
using the out-of-bag (OOB) estimate (which can be obtaining during the bootstrap for each tree).
We nd it to be rather small in our application: most normalized root mean squared errors are
around 0.11. is result is in line with simulations by Stekhoven and Bühlmann (2011) who
compare it to other prediction schemes based on K nearest neighbors, EM-type LASSO algorithms,
3Note that this setup deals transparently with missing values in individual characteristics (such as missing education).
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or multivariate normal schemes and nd it to perform comparatively well with both continuous
and categorical variables.4
B.2. Multilevel Regression and Poststratication
e approach described in the last section is closely related to MRP (Gelman and Lile 1997;
Park et al. 2006; Lax and Phillips 2013), which has become quite popular in political science. Both
strategies involve ing a model that is predictive of preferences given observed characteristics
followed by a weighting step that re-balances observed characteristics to their distribution in the
Census. What dierentiates MRP from the previous approach is that it imposes more structure in
the modeling step both in terms of functional form and distributional assumptions. By utilizing
the advantages of hierarchical models with normally distributed random coecients it produces
preference estimates that are shrunken towards group means (Gelman et al. 2013: 116f.).5 No
such structural assumptions are made when using Random Forests. It will thus be instructive to
compare how much our results depend on such modeling choices.
MRP implementation For each roll call item in the CCES we estimate a separate model express-
ing the probability of supporting a proposal as a function of demographic characteristics. e
demographic aributes included in our model broadly follow Lax and Phillips (2009, 2013) and
are race, gender, education, age, and income.6 Race is captured in three categories (white, black,
other), education in ve (high school or less, some college, 2-year college degree, 4-year college
degree, graduate degree). Age is comprised of 6 categories (18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, 70+)
while income is comprised of 13 categories (with thresholds 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80,
100, 120, 150 [in $1,000]). Our model also includes district-specic intercepts. For each roll-call,
we estimate the following hierarchical model using penalized maximum likelihood (Chung et al.
2013):
Pr (Yi = 1) = logit−1
(













4See Tang and Ishwaran (2017) for further empirical validation of this strategy. See also Honaker and Plutzer
(2016), who compare a similar matching strategy (but based on a multivariate normal model) with MRP estimated
preferences using the CCES.
5is might be especially appropriate when some groups are small. e median number of respondents per district
in the CCES is 506 and no district has fewer than 192 sampled respondents. But since we slice preferences further
by income sub-groups, one may be worried that the sample size in some districts is small. MRP deals with this
potential issue at the cost of making distributional assumptions.
6We also estimated a version of the model including a macro-level predictor, which has been found to improve the
quality of the model. We use the demographically purged state predictor of Lax and Phillips (2013: 15), that is,
the average liberal–conservative variation in state-level public opinion that is not due to variation demographic
predictors. In our case this produces rather similar MRP estimates.
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We employ the notation of Gelman and Hill (2007) and denote by j[i] the category j to which
individual i belongs. Here, β0 is an intercept and the αs are hierarchically modeled eects for the
various demographic groups. Each is drawn from a common normal distribution with mean zero


























, m = 1, . . . , 5 (B.5)




, n = 1, . . . , 13 (B.6)
is setup induces shrinkage estimates for the same demographic categories in dierent districts.
Note that using xed eects for characteristics with few categories (Specically, gender) does not
impact our results. e district intercepts are drawn from a normal distribution with state-specic








Our nal preferences estimates for each income group on each roll call are obtained by using
cell-specic predictions from the above hierarchical model, weighted by the population frequencies
(obtained from our Census le) for each cell in each congressional district.
B.3. Model results under various preference estimation strategies
e estimates of district-level preferences obtained via our SAE approach and MRP are in
broad agreement: e median dierence in district preferences between SAE and MRP is 2.5
percentage points for low income and −0.1 percentage points for high income constituents. A large
part of this dierence is due to the heavier tails of the distribution of district preferences for each
roll call estimated by our approach—perhaps not surprising given the shrinkage characteristics of
MRP. To what extent do these dierences in the distribution of preferences aect our estimated
union eects?
Panel (A) of Table B.1 shows estimates for our six main specications using MRP-based pref-
erences. e results are unequivocal: using MRP estimated preferences leads to more pronounced
estimates in all specications. Using specication (6), which includes state policies, measures of
district social capital and district covariates interacted with preferences, as well as district xed
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eects, we nd that a unit increase in union membership increased responsiveness of legislators
towards the preferences of low income constituents by about 8 (±2) percentage points (compared
to only 5 points using our measurement strategy). Responsiveness estimated for high income pref-
erences are similarly larger. Note that while larger, all estimates also carry increased condence
intervals.
Table B.1
Model results using dierent strategies to estimate district-level preferences.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: Multilevel Regression & Poststratication
Low income preferences 0.182 0.158 0.181 0.185 0.115 0.081
(0.021) (0.024) (0.026) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
High income preferences −0.136 −0.119 −0.139 −0.137 −0.091 −0.064
(0.017) (0.019) (0.021) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
B: Raw CCES means
Low income preferences 0.080 0.061 0.063 0.080 0.043 0.028
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
High income preferences −0.027 −0.013 −0.010 −0.025 −0.018 −0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Note: Specications (1) to (6) are as in Table I in the main text but using dierent strategies to estimate district-level
preferences of three income groups. Entries are eects of standard deviation increase in union membership on marginal
eect of income group preferences on legislator vote.
As a further point of comparison, panel (B) shows preferences estimated via raw cell means in
the CCES. Due to the issues discussed above, the raw data cannot be taken as gold standard, but it
is nonetheless informative to see how much the results vary. Our core results even obtain when
we simply use raw cell means without any statistical modeling to counter non-representative
distributions of individual characteristics and small cell sizes. We nd that in our strictest speci-
cation, a unit increase in union membership still increases responsiveness towards low income
constituents by about 3 (±1) percentage points.
In sum, all three approaches lead to the same qualitative conclusions about the moderating
eect of unions on unequal representation in Congress. e two alternative approaches to deal
with the problem that CCS surveys are not representative of congressional districts by design
suggest that a larger eect of unions than the naive approach using the unadjusted survey data.
antitatively, our preferred estimates are based on small area estimation via random forests as
they are less reliant on normality assumptions and are systematically more conservative than
those based on MRP.
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C. Alternative Income Thresholds
is section discusses the impact of dierent income thresholds on our results. In Table I in the
main text, preferences of income groups are based on a district-specic income thresholds spliing
the population into three groups (at the 33rd and 66th percentile). us, voters are classied
as ‘low income’ relative to other voters in their congressional district. For example, during the
111th Congress a voter with an income of $40,000 would be part of the low income group in most
of Massachuses’ districts (where low income thresholds vary from about $40,000 to $50,000),
but not in the 8th (where the threshold is about $30,000). If income threshold were state-specic
instead, he or she would be considered low income everywhere in the state (as the state-specic
low income threshold is now ≈$47,000).
Table C.1
Model results using dierent denitions of income groups.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: State-specic income thresholds
Low income preferences 0.105 0.082 0.097 0.107 0.067 0.044
(0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
High income preferences −0.062 −0.036 −0.052 −0.065 −0.049 −0.027
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
B: Shied income thresholds: p20 - p80
Low income preferences 0.098 0.077 0.09 0.100 0.063 0.042
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
High income preferences −0.054 −0.031 −0.046 −0.057 −0.044 −0.025
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Note: Specications (1) to (6) are as in Table I in the main text but with income groups dened via dierent income
thresholds. Entries are eects of standard deviation increase in union membership on marginal eect of income group
preferences on legislator vote.
Not all states display as much variation in income-group thresholds. us, using state- instead
of district-specic thresholds does not alter our core results in an appreciable way. As Panel (A)
shows, the resulting marginal eects estimates for all six model specications are remarkably
similar when using preferences of income groups dened by state-specic thresholds. In panel (B)
we no longer divide the population into three equally sized income groups. Instead, we restrict
the low-income group to only those below the 20th percentile of the (district-specic) income
distribution. Similarly, we classied as high income only those above the 80th percentile. Our
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resulting estimates for the union-responsiveness marginal eects are slightly smaller, but still of a
substantively relevant magnitude and statistically dierent from zero.
D. Measures of District Organizational Capacity
In the empirical analysis reported in this Appendix, we use the number of religious congrega-
tions as another proxy for associational life, complementing the social capital index used in the
main text. In a previous version of the paper, we also use certication elections as a proxy for
unions’ mobilization capacity. Here we provide some background and explain in more detail how
we calculate both variables.
Congregations As one proxy for district level social capital we use the number of congregations
per inhabitant. e number of congregations in a given district is not readily available for the
years covered in our study. erefore, we spatially aggregate county-level measures from the
2010 Religious Congregations and Membership Study to the congressional district level using
areal interpolation techniques that take into account the population distribution between counties
and districts. We use a geographic country-to-district equivalence le calculated from Census
shapeles. is is combined with population weights for each country-district intersection derived
using the Master Area Block Level Equivalency database v1.3.3 (available from the Missouri
Census Data Center), which calculates them based on about 5.3 million Census blocks. With
these weights in hand we can interpolate county-level to district-level congregation counts using
weighted means (for states with at-large districts, this reduces to a simple summation, as counties
are perfectly nested within districts).
NLRB certication elections In a previous version of the paper, we also used union certication
elections as a proxy for workers’ capability to organize for collective action. As has been pointed
out by readers and discussants, one concern with this variable is that it may be driven to a
signicant extent by the existing stock of local unions, as unionization requires people and
resources. While it may be useful to distinguish realized union membership from unionization
eort and our results are robust to accounting for NLRB elections, in line with the suggestions we
dropped this robustness test. For completeness and consistency, we document the construction of
the measure.
e formation of unions is regulated by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRB) enacted in
1935 (see Budd 2018: ch. 6). A successful union organization process usually requires an absolute
majority of employees voting for the proposed union in a certication election held under the
guidelines of the NLRB. Geing the NLRB to conduct an election requires that there is sucient
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interest among employees in an appropriate bargaining unit to be represented by a union. For
proof of sucient interest, the NLRB requires that at least 30% of employees sign an authorization
card stating they authorize a particular union to represent them for the purpose of collective
bargaining. Building support and collecting the required signatures takes organizational eort.
For workers, unionization has features of a public good. Everybody may gain through beer
conditions from collective bargaining, but contributing to the organizational drive is costly for
each individual. Beyond mere opportunity costs, there also is a non-zero risk of being (illegally)
red by the employer for those especially active. If more than 50% of employees sign authorization
cards, then the union can request voluntary recognition without a certication election. However,
the employer has the right to deny this, in which case a certication election is held. In his labor
relations textbook, Budd (2018: 199) notes that voluntary card check recognition is “the exception
rather than the norm because employers typically refuse to recognize unions voluntarily.”
We use the NLRB’s database on election reports to extract all aempts to certify (or de-certify)
a local union. ey are available from www.nlrb.gov. Each database entry is a vote concerning a
bargaining unit; the average unit size is 25 employees. ere are about 2200 elections each year.
Each individual case le usually provides address information on the employer and the site where
the election was held. Using this information, we geocode each individual case report and locate
it in a congressional district.
E. Additional Robustness Tests
In this section we describe several additional robustness tests.
Redistricting First, we address the fact that several cases of court-ordered redistricting in Geor-
gia and Texas lead to inter-Census changes in district boundaries. We exclude both states in
specication (1) of Table E.1 and nd our results unchanged.
Alternative measures of social capital Next we consider two alternative measures of social capital.
First, the number of bowling alleys in an area (Putnam 2000). As the social capital index used in the
main text, this variables comes from Rupasingha and Goetz (2008) and was spatially reweighted
to districts. Second, the number of congregations per inhabitant. e construction of this measure
is explained above (Appendix D). ese two measures are less likely than the social capital index
to be the result of unionization. We nd that these changes in measurement do not qualitatively
alter our ndings. Unsurprisingly, the estimated union eects are somewhat larger than in the
specication adjusting for the social capital index.
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1:1 mapping of CCES preferences to roll calls We begin by limiting our sample by creating a
unique mapping between preferences and roll call votes. Some of our CCEs preferences estimates
are linked to more than one Congressional roll call. To investigate if this aects our results,
specication (3) uses a 1:1 map dropping additionally available roll calls aer the rst match. is




Low income High income
preferences preferences N
(1) Redistricting 0.067 (0.014) −0.051 (0.013) 12,784
(2a) Social capital: bowling alleys 0.070 (0.015) −0.051 (0.014) 14,153
(2b) Social capital: churches 0.072 (0.015) −-0.051 (0.014) 14,282
(3) Injective preference roll call map 0.063 (0.013) −0.041 (0.013) 11,104
(4) Extreme preferences excl. 0.074 (0.016) −0.048 (0.015) 13,308
(5) New York excluded 0.070 (0.015) −0.048 (0.014) 14,730
(6) Local Union Concentration 0.065 (0.014) −0.047 (0.014) 15,780
(7) Trimmed LPM estimator 0.074 (0.015) −0.055 (0.014) 15,426
(8) Errors-in-variables 0.062 (0.004) −0.054 (0.004) 15,345
Note: Based on specication (5) of Table I. (7) uses trimmed estimator of Horrace and Oaxaca (2006). Specication (8) shows
results from an errors-in-variables model implemented in a Bayesian framework (entries are posterior means and standard
deviations). See text for details.
Extreme preferences excluded In specication (4) we investigate if extreme district preferences on
some roll calls drive our results. To do so, we trim the distribution of preferences at the boom and
the top. For each roll call we exclude districts with preference estimates below the 5th and above
the 95th percentile. Using only trimmed preferences has no appreciable impact on our estimates.
New York excluded Another test estimates our model with the state of New York excluded from
the sample. While Becher et al. (2018) found that LM form estimates of union strength correlate
highly with aggregated state-level estimates derived from the Current Population survey, they
note that this correlation is lower for New York. In specication (5) we thus show that our results
are not aected by its exclusion.
Union Concentration Our data on local unions are from Becher et al. (2018), who also nd that
the local concentration of unions is an important dimension. While Becher et al. (2018) show that
both dimensions (membership and concentration) vary independently, it is prudent to check if
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our results on the impact of union membership on representation still obtain when accounting for
the structure of union organization. In specication (6) we show this to be the case.
Trimmed LPM estimator A seventh, more technical, specication implements the trimmed
estimator suggested by Horrace and Oaxaca (2006). It accounts for the fact that we estimate a
linear probability model to a binary dependent variable, which entails the possibility that the
model-implied linear predictor lies outside the unit interval. Our results in Table E.1 indicate that
this change does not materially aect our core results (if anything, they become slightly larger).
Errors-in-variables Our nal test accounts for the errors-in-variables problem caused by the fact
that our district preference measures are based on estimates. While, in general, standard errors
for our district-level estimates are quite small relative to the quantity being measured and one
expects a downward bias in parameter estimates in a linear model with errors-in-variables, we
estimate this specication to get a sense of the quantitative magnitude of the change in parameter
estimates.7 We nd that adjusting for measurement error produces very lile quantitative change;
both estimates are within the condence bounds of our non-corrected estimates.
F. Post-Double-Selection Estimator
e post-double-selection models in the main text provide a relaxation of the linearity and
exogeneity assumptions made in our main model. To do so we use the double-post-selection
estimator proposed by Belloni et al. (Belloni et al. 2013, 2017). Specically, this model setup aims to
reduce the possible impact of omied variable bias by accounting for a large number of confounders
in the most exible way possible. is can be achieved by moving beyond restricting confounders
to be linear and additive, and instead considering a exible, unrestricted (non-parametric) function.
is leads to the formulation of the following partially linear model (Robinson 1988) equation (for
ease of exposition we omit district xed eects in the notation and ignore i subscripts):
yjd = µ







jd + д(Zd) + ϵjd (F.1)
7We implement this model in a Bayesian framework, where we incorporate the measurement error model directly
into the posterior distribution. To specify the variance of the measurement error for low and high income group
preferences, we average the standard errors of the district-group means from the raw CCES data (pre-Census
matching). Measurement error variance is slightly larger for low income preferences (0.029) than for high income
preferences (0.025). We use the setup proposed in Richardson and Gilks (1993), implemented in Stan (v.2.17.0) and
estimated (due to the size of our data set) using mean eld variational inference. We use normal priors with mean
zero and standard deviation (SD) of 100 for all regression coecients, and inverse Gamma priors with shape and
scale 0.01 for residuals. In the measurement error equation, we use normal priors with mean zero and SD of 10 for
the mean of the measurement error and a student-t prior with 3 degrees of freedom and mean 1, SD 10 for the
standard deviation of the measurement. e reported entries are posterior means and standard deviations.
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with E(ϵjd |Zs,Ud, θjd) = 0. Here,y is the vote of a representative in a given district,Ud is the level of
union density. e function д(Zd) captures the possibly high-dimensional and nonlinear inuence
of confounders (interacted with income group preferences). e utility of this specication as a
robustness tests stems from the fact that it imposes no a priori restriction on the functional form
of confounding variables. A second key ingredient in a model capturing biases due to omied
variables is the relationship between the treatment (union density) and confounders. erefore,
we consider the following auxiliary treatment equation
Ud =m(Zd) +vi, E(vi |Zd = 0), (F.2)
which relates treatment to covariates Zd . e function m(Zd) summarizes the confounding eect
that potentially create omied variable bias ifm , 0, which is to be expected in an observational
study such as ours.
e next step is to create approximations to both д(·) andm(·) by including a large number
(p) of control terms wd = P(Zd) ∈ Rp . ese control terms can be spline transforms of covariates,
higher order interaction terms, etc. Even with an initially limited set of variables, the number
of control terms can grow large, say p > 200. To limit the number of estimated coecients, we
assume that д and m are approximately sparse (Belloni et al. 2013) and can be modeled using s
non-zero coecients (with s  p) selected using regularization techniques, such as the LASSO
(see Tibshirani 1996; see Ratkovic and Tingley 2017 for a recent exposition in a political science
context):
yjd = µ









dβд0 + rдd + ζjd (F.3)
Ud = w
′
dβm0 + rmi +vd (F.4)
Here, rдi and rmi are approximation errors.
However, before proceeding we need to consider the problem that variable selection techniques,
such as the LASSO, are intended for prediction, not inference. In fact, a “naive” application of
variable selection, where one keeps only the signicant w variables in equation (F.3) fails. It
relies on perfect model selection and can lead to biased inferences and misleading condence
intervals (see Leeb and Pötscher 2008). us, one can re-express the problem as one of prediction
by substituting the auxiliary treatment equation (F.4) for Dd in (F.3) yielding a reduced form
equation with a composite approximation error (cf. Belloni et al. 2013). Now both equations in the
system represent predictive relationships and are thus amenable to high-dimensional selection
techniques.
Note that using this dual equation setup is also necessary to guard against variable selection
errors. To see this, consider the consequence of applying variable selection techniques to the
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outcome equation only. In trying to predict y with w , an algorithm (such as LASSO) will favor
variables with large coecients in β̄0 but will ignore those of intermediate impact. However,
omied variables that are strongly related to the treatment, i.e., with large coecients in βm0, can
lead to large omied variable bias in the estimate of η even when the size of their coecient in β̄0
is moderate. e Post-double selection estimator suggested by Belloni et al. (2013) addresses this
problem, by basing selection on both reduced form equations. Let Î1 be the control set selected by
LASSO of yjd on wd in the rst predictive equation, and let Î2 be the control set selected by LASSO
ofUd on wd in the second equation. en, parameter estimates for the eects of union density and
the regularized control set are obtained by OLS estimation of equation (F.1) with the set Î = Î1 ∪ Î2
included as controls (replacing д(·)). In our implementation we employ the root-LASSO (Belloni
et al. 2011) in each selection step.
is estimator has low bias and yields accurate condence intervals even under moderate
selection mistakes (Belloni and Chernozhukov 2009; Belloni et al. 2014).8 Responsible for this
robustness is the indirect LASSO step selecting theUd-control set. It nds controls whose omission
leads to “large” omied variable bias and includes them in the model. Any variables that are not
included (“omied”) are therefore at most mildly associated to Ud and yjd , which decidedly limits
the scope of omied variable bias (Chernozhukov et al. 2015).
G. Nonparametric Evidence for Union-Preferences Interaction
As discussed in the main text, we want to estimate a specication that makes as lile a priori
assumptions about functional form relationships between variables (including their interactions).
us, we non-parametrically model yijd = f (z) with z = [θ ljd, θhjd,Ud,Xd] by approximating it via
Kernel Regularized Least Squares (Hainmueller and Hazle 2014), y = Kc . Here, K is an N × N
Gaussian Kernel matrix
K = exp




with an associated vector of weights c . Intuitively, one can think of KRLS as a local regression
method, which predicts the outcome at each covariate point by calculating an optimally weighted
sum of locally ed functions. e KRLS algorithm uses Gaussian kernels centered around an
observation. e weights c are chosen to produce the best t to the data. Since a possibly large
number of c values provide (approximately) optimal weights it makes sense to prefer values of c
that produce “smoother” function surfaces. is is achieved via regularization by adding a squared
8For a very general discussion see Belloni et al. (2017).
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L2 penalty to the least squares criterion:
c∗ = argmin
c∈RD
[(y − Kc)′(y − Kc) + λc′Kc] , (G.2)
which yields an estimator for c as c∗ = (K + λI )−1y (see Hainmueller and Hazle 2014, appendix).
is leaves two parameters to be set, σ 2 and λ. Following Hainmueller and Hazle (2014), we set
σ 2 = D the number of columns in z and let λ be chosen by minimizing leave-one-out loss.
e benet of this approach is twofold. First, it allows for an approximation of highly nonlinear
and non-additive functional forms (without having to construct non-linear terms as we do in
the post-double selection LASSO). Second, it allows us to check if the marginal eects of group
preferences changes with levels of union density without explicitly specifying this interaction
term (and instead learning it from the data). To do the laer one can calculate pointwise partial
derivatives of y with respect to a chosen covariate z(d) (Hainmueller and Hazle 2014: 156). For

















ese yields as many partial derivatives as there are cases. We apply a thin plate smoother (with
parameters chosen via cross-validation) to plot these against district-level union membership in
Figure G.1. Perhaps unsurprisingly, we nd that the assumption of an exactly linear interaction
specication is too restrictive, especially in the case of the preferences of high income constituents.
However, the most noteworthy result clearly is the fact that, using a non-parametric model
not including an a priori interaction between union membership and preferences, we nd clear
evidence that union membership moderates the relationship between preferences and legislative
voting. For low income constituents, increasing district-level union membership steadily increases
the marginal eect of their preferences on legislators’ vote choice. Moving from low levels of union
membership (at the 25th percentile) to median levels of union membership increase low-income
preference responsiveness by about 5 percentage points. An equally sized increase from the
median to the 75th percentile increases responsiveness by almost 8 percentage points. We also
nd similar (albeit weaker) evidence for an interaction between high income group preferences
and union membership.
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Nonparametric estimate of interaction between union membership and preferences
Note: is gure plots partial eects (summarized using thin-plate spline smoothing) of preferences of low and high
income constituents on legislative votes at levels of district union membership. Estimates obtained via KRLS.
H. Heterogeneity
Union type Is our nding driven by a particular type of union? A recent strand of research
stresses the special characteristics of public unions and their political inuence (e.g., Anzia and
Moe 2016; Flavin and Hartney 2015). Hence, one may ask whether our ndings mainly reect the
inuence of private-sector unions since public sector unions are too narrow in their interests to
mitigate unequal responsiveness. Panel (A) of Table H.1 provides some evidence on this question.
e administrative forms used to measure union membership do not distinguish between private
and public unions, and local unions may contain workers from both the private and the public
sector. To calculate an approximate measure of district public union membership, we identify
unions with public sector members (based on their name) and create separate union membership
counts for “public” and the remaining “non-public” unions (see appendix A for details).
Our ndings suggests that the coecient for the impact of a districts’ public union membership
on the responsiveness of legislators to the preferences of the poor is sizable (at about 7 percentage
points) and clearly statistically dierent from zero. At the same time, the coecient for the
remaining “non-public” unions is slightly reduced. e dierence between the two estimates is not
statistically distinguishable from zero. is nding does not support the hypothesis of a null-eect
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of public sector unions. It also suggests that the changing private-public union composition will
not necessarily lead to less collective voice in Congress.
Bill ideology Panel (B) explores whether the eect of unions varies with the ideological direction
of the bill that is voted on. Based on the partisan vote margin of the roll call vote, we dene an
indicator variable for conservative roll calls and estimate separate coecients for each bill type.
We nd that union eects are relevant (and signicant) for both bill types, they are larger for
conservative votes. A standard deviation increase in union membership increases responsiveness
to the preferences of low-income constituents by about 9 (±2) percentage points for conservative
bills compared to about 5 (±1) points for liberal bills. e dierence is larger for the preferences
of high income constituents. In both cases the dierence in marginal eects between liberal and
conservative bills is statistically signicant. Our ndings suggest that union inuence is more
relevant for bills that have (potentially) adverse consequences for low income constituents. We
trace this issue further in the next specication.
Table H.1
Eect heterogeneity. Marginal eects of unionization on legislative
responsiveness to low and high income groups.
Low income High income
(A) Private vs. Public unions
Public unions 0.074 (0.016) −0.058 (0.015)
Non-public unions 0.054 (0.016) −0.027 (0.016)
(B) Bill ideology
Conservative bill 0.086 (0.017) −0.086 (0.018)
Liberal bill 0.052 (0.014) −0.028 (0.013)
(C) AFL-CIO endorsement
No position 0.054 (0.014) −0.054 (0.013)
Endorsement 0.077 (0.015) −0.040 (0.014)
Note: Estimates for ηL and ηH with cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. N=15,780. Panel (A)
shows separate eects for district counts of union members for unions classied as public or non-public
(see text). Statistical tests for the dierence in union type yield p = 0.172 for low income preferences and
p = 0.027 for high income ones. Panel (B) estimates separate eects for bills classied as conservative
or liberal based on their predominant party vote. Tests for signicance of dierence: p = 0.009 for low
and p = 0.000 for high income preferences. Panel (C) classies bills with economic content where the
AFLCIO has taken a public stand for or against it (depending on bill content). Tests for signicance of
dierence: p = 0.003 for low income, p = 0.049 for high income preferences.
Union voting recommendations In panel (C) we consider bills with economic content and that
have (or have not) been endorsed explicitly by the largest union confederation, the AFL-CIO. Our
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denition of endorsement is based on voting recommendations made publicly by the AFL-CIO.9
AFL-CIO recommendations signal the salience of the issue to unions, and they were made for more
than half of the votes in the analysis. Panel (C) shows that the impact of union membership on
legislators’ responsiveness for bills especially relevant to low-income citizens is about 2 percentage
points larger for votes on which the AFL-CIO had taken a prior position. is dierence is
statistically dierent from zero (p = 0.003).10 e fact that districts with higher union membership
see beer representation of the less auent more so when issues are salient to unions bolsters the
interpretation that our main result is actually driven by unions’ capacity for political action. is
nding is also consistent with micro-level studies of the eects of union position-taking (Ahlquist
et al. 2014; Kim and Margalit 2017).
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Stekhoven, D. J. and P. Bühlmann (2011). Missforest. non-parametric missing value imputation for
mixed-type data. Bioinformatics 28(1), 112–118.
Tang, F. and H. Ishwaran (2017). Random forest missing data algorithms. Statistical Analysis and
Data Mining: e ASA Data Science Journal 10, 363–377.
Tibshirani, R. (1996). Regression shrinkage and selection via the lasso. Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society B 58(1), 267–288.
Torrieri, N., ACSO, DSSD, and SEHSD Program Sta (2014). American community survey design
and methodology. United States Census Bureau. [www.census.gov/programs-surveys/
acs/methodology/design-and-methodology.html].
22
